We give an extension of de Finetti's concept of coherence to unbounded (but real-valued) random variables that allows for gambling in the presence of infinite previsions. We present a finitely additive extension of the Daniell integral to unbounded random variables that we believe has advantages over Lebesgue-style integrals in the finitely additive setting. We also give a general version of the Fundamental Theorem of Prevision to deal with conditional previsions and unbounded random variables.
Introduction.
presented a theory of finitely additive probability in which the concept of prevision played the roles of both probability and expected value (or expectation). De Finetti's theory was motivated in two different, but equivalent, manners. First, he developed a theory of coherent gambling in which a bookie chooses fair prices for gambles while trying to avoid uniform sure loss. Second, he took a decision-theoretic approach in which an agent chooses previsions for random variables while being subject to a loss function. The agent tries to avoid choosing previsions such that an alternative choice could achieve uniformly smaller loss.
De Finetti developed his theory fairly completely for the case in which all random variables under consideration are bounded. He realized that unbounded random variables introduce interesting issues for his theory, but he did not pursue those issues very far. Crisma, Gigante, and Millossovich (1997) and Crisma and Gigante (2001) present one form of an extension of de Finetti's theory to unbounded random variables. This paper presents a number of extensions that are more in the spirit of de Finetti's original theory.
Section 2 gives a brief summary of de Finetti's theory for random variables with finite previsions and the notation that will be used in the rest of the paper. Section 3 gives our extension of coherence to infinite previsions and compares the extension to the existing extension of Crisma et al. (1997) and Crisma and Gigante (2001) . Section 4 shows how the fair price and decision theoretic motivations of de Finetti's theory remain equivalent in the extension to unbounded random variables and to more general loss functions than de Finetti originally envisioned. Section 5 gives an introduction to finitely additive Daniell integrals along with their relation to finitely additive expectations and coherence. Section 6 characterizes the relationship between conditional and marginal previsions. Section 7 shows how to extend a collection of coherent previsions to an arbitrary larger collection.
2. De Finetti's Two Definitions of Coherence. Coherence of previsions, as de Finetti (1974, Chapter 3) formulates it, is the criterion that a rational decision maker tries to avoid making decisions that lead to uniformly larger loss than alternative available decisions.
Let Ω be a set. The elements of Ω will be called states and denoted ω. Subsets of Ω are called events. Random variables are real-valued functions with domain Ω, which we denote with capital letters. We take the liberty of identifying events with their indicator random variables. That is, if B ⊆ Ω, we let B(ω) stand for the random variable that equals 1 for all ω ∈ B and equals 0 for all ω ∈ B. The decisions that de Finetti (1974) contemplated are the assignments of (conditional) previsions for random variables. Definition 1. Let X be a random variable and let B be a nonempty event.
A prevision P (X|B) for X given B is a fair price for buying and selling X under the condition that B occurs. That is, for all real α, the gamble that causes the agent to gain αB[X − P (X)] is considered fair (or acceptable). If B = Ω, we can denote P (X|Ω) = P (X) and call it a marginal prevision for X.
A collection {P (X i |B i ) : i ∈ I} of such previsions is coherent 1 if, for every finite subset {i 1 , . . . , i n } ⊆ I and all real α 1 , . . . , α n sup ω n j=1 α j B ij (ω)[X ij (ω) − P (X ij )] ≥ 0.
(1)
That is, the resulting fair gambles do not allow uniformly negative gain (also known as uniform sure loss).
A collection of forecasts is coherent 2 if, for every rival set {Q(X i |B i ) : i ∈ I} of previsions for the same random variables, every {i 1 , . . . , i n } ⊆ I, and all nonnegative α 1 , . . . , α n ,
That is, no rival set of previsions leads to uniformly smaller squared-error loss.
De Finetti (1974, pp. 88-89) proved that a decision maker who wishes to be both coherent 1 and coherent 2 must choose the same previsions for both purposes. Squared-error loss is a special case of a strictly proper scoring rule.
Definition 2. A scoring rule for coherent previsions of a random variable X is a real-valued loss function g with two real arguments: a value of the random variable and a potential prevision q. Let P be a collection of probability distributions that give finite prevision to X. We say that g is proper for P if, for every probability P ∈ P, P [g(X, q)] is minimized (as a function of q) by q = P (X). If, in addition, only the quantity q = P (X) minimizes expected score, then the scoring rule is strictly proper.
Some authors reserve the qualification "strictly proper" for scoring rules that are designed to elicit an entire distribution, rather than just the mean of a distribution. (See Gneiting, 2011a , who calls the latter kind strictly consistent.) For the remainder of this paper, we follow the language of Definition 2, which matches the usage in Gneiting (2011b) . Schervish, et al. (2013) consider the class of all scoring rules of the form
where λ is a measure that is mutually absolutely continuous with Lebesgue measure and is finite on every bounded interval. They also show that all such scoring rules are strictly proper for the class of probability measures that give finite mean to g(X, q) for at least one q. The form (2) is suggested by equation (4.3) of Savage (1971) . Theorem 1 in Section 4 generalizes the equivalence of coherence 1 and coherence 2 to the class of strictly proper scoring rules of the form (2).
3. Infinite Previsions. If one wishes to consider arbitrary sets of random variables, including unbounded random variables, then there will be examples of random variables that cannot be assigned finite previsions or expectations. One cannot expect a bookie to offer to pay an infinite amount in exchange for a finite-valued random variable, no matter how likely it is to take large values. In particular, (1) makes no sense as a criterion for coherence if previsions are allowed to be infinite. Instead, we interpret an infinite prevision as an offer to accept one side or the other of a gamble, but not both sides. For example, P (X) = ∞ means that the bookie would pay an arbitrarily large amount c in exchange for receiving X, but she would not accept any finite amount in exchange for paying out X. We express that idea formally in Definition 3.
Definition 3. Let X be a random variable, and let B be a nonempty event.
To say that P (X|B) = ∞ means that every finite number can be the price to buy X, but no number can be the price to sell X, under the condition that B occurs. Similarly, to say that P (X|B) = −∞ means that every finite number can be the price to sell X, but no number can be the price to buy X, under the condition that B occurs. The resulting gambles αB[X − c] that the agent is willing to accept, namely those with α ≥ 0 when P (X|B) = ∞ and those with α ≤ 0 when P (X|B) = −∞ are called acceptable. We also call each finite sum of acceptable gambles acceptable.
We can now extend coherence 1 to collections that include infinite previsions.
Definition 4. Let {P (X i |B i ) : i ∈ I} be a collection of previsions. The previsions are coherent 1 if,
for all {i 1 , . . . , i n } ⊆ I, all real α 1 , . . . , α n such that α j ≥ 0 for all j with P (X ij |B ij ) = ∞ and α j ≤ 0 for all j with P (X ij |B ij ) = −∞, and all real c 1 . . . , c n such that c j = P (X ij |B ij ) for each j such that P (X ij |B ij ) is finite. That is, no acceptable gamble leads to uniform sure loss.
A necessary condition for P (X) = ∞ to be coherent 1 is that X is unbounded above, and a necessary condition for P (X) = −∞ to be coherent 1 is that X is unbounded below. But there are unbounded random variables with coherent 1 finite previsions.
Example 1. Let Ω be the integers, and suppose that P ({ω = k}) = 2 −k for each integer k ≥ 1. This is a countably additive probability. Let X(ω) = ∞ k=1 k{ω = k}. The countably additive expectation of X is 2, which is a coherent 1 finite prevision for X. Actually, every number greater than or equal to 2 (including ∞) is a coherent 1 prevision for X. On the other hand, if
The countably additive expectation of Z is 0, but we will set P (Z) = −∞. Finally, let V = Y + Z. We cannot assign P (V ) = ∞ − ∞, however every extended real number is a possible coherent 1 prevision for V . The rest of this example shows that the stated previsions are coherent 1 . The random variables to which we have assigned previsions are the indicators of the events {ω = k} for all integers k and the random variables X, Y, Z, V . The most general acceptable gamble is a linear combination of finitely many of the indicators and X − x (with x ≥ 2 and nonnegative coefficient if P (X) = ∞) together with Y − y (with y real and nonnegative coefficient), Z − z (with z real and nonpositive coefficient), and V − v (with v real and coefficient whose sign matches the sign of the prevision if P (V ) is infinite. That is, let k 1 , . . . , k n be integers, and let
where x ≥ 2, y, z and v are finite, An alternative definition of coherent infinite marginal previsions was presented by Crisma et al. (1997) . We repeat their definition here, and then prove that it is equivalent to Definition 4 for marginal previsions.
Definition 5. Let I be an index set, and let D = {X i : i ∈ I} be a collection of random variables defined on Ω. Let P be an extended-real-valued function defined on D. We say that P is extended-coherent if
for every finite integer n, all i 1 , . . . , i n ∈ I, and all real α 1 , . . . , α n such that all infinite terms of the form α j P (X ij ) have the same sign.
It is not clear how Definition 5 regulates the prices that a bookie is willing to pay/accept for various gambles with infinite previsions. Furthermore, Definition 5 does not apply to conditional previsions as stated. On the other hand, Definitions 5 and 4 are equivalent when applied to marginal previsions. Lemma 1. A collection {P (X i ) : i ∈ I} of marginal previsions is extendedcoherent if and only if it is coherent 1 .
Proof. For the "if" direction, assume that the previsions are coherent 1 . Let n be a finite integer, let i 1 , . . . , i n ∈ I, and let α 1 , . . . , α n be real numbers such that all infinite values of α j P (X ij ) have the same sign. We need to show that (4) holds. First, suppose that all of the P (X ij ) are finite. By coherence 1 , we know that
Inequality (6) implies the first inequality in (4), and (5) implies the second. Next, suppose that there are some infinite previsions among the P (X ij ) and all of the corresponding α j P (X ij ) have the same sign. If the common sign is negative, then n j=1 α j P (X ij ) = −∞, the second inequality in (4) is trivially satisfied, and the α j corresponding to infinite previsions all have the wrong signs to be used in acceptable gambles. It follows that for all real c 1 , . . . , c n such that c j = P (X ij ) whenever P (X ij ) is finite,
which implies the first inequality in (4). If the common sign of the α j P (X ij ) is positive, then n j=1 α j P (X ij ) = ∞, the first inequality in (4) is trivially satisfied, and the α j corresponding to infinite previsions all have the correct signs to be used in acceptable gambles. It follows that for all real c 1 , . . . , c n such that c j = P (X ij ) whenever P (X ij ) is finite,
which implies the second inequality in (4).
For the "only if" direction, assume that the previsions are extended-coherent. Let n be a finite integer, let i 1 , . . . , i n ∈ I, and let α 1 , . . . , α n be real numbers such that all infinite values of α j P (X ij ) are positive. We need to show that
for all real c 1 , . . . , c n such that c j = P (X ij ) for all i such that P (X ij ) is finite. If all of the P (X ij ) are finite, then (7) follows from (4), so assume that at least one P (X ij ) is infinite. It follows that n j=1 α j P (X ij ) = ∞, and (4) implies that sup ω∈Ω n j=1 X ij (ω) = ∞. Since, Regazzini (1987) (both for bounded and for unbounded random variables) that are designed to regulate the extreme indeterminacy of conditional previsions given events with zero probability. We prefer to avoid such restrictions on the definition of coherence for reasons illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Let Ω be the positive integers, and let P (·) be a coherent 2 prevision that assigns probability 0 to every singleton {n} with n a positive integer. Many such marginal previsions exist. Let
and let B = {1, 2, 3, 4} so that P (B) = P (X) = 0 and BX = X. The gamble
is acceptable by all definitions of coherence. However, the restrictions that Regazzini (1987) , Crisma and Gigante (2001) , and others impose would say that it is incoherent to assign P (X|B) a value outside of the closed interval [1, 4] . That is, it is incoherent to offer the gamble αB(X − 0) because 0 ∈ [1, 4]. But, (8) shows that αB(X − 0) is already being offered without even contemplating what would be a coherent value for P (X|B). Furthermore, for every real p, −αpB is also being offered unconditionally, so that the sum
is being offered for every real p. We think it is perfectly reasonable to assign P (X|B) a value between 1 and 4 if one wishes, but we don't believe that it should be called incoherent to do otherwise. After all, the gambles that would be ruled out by such a declaration of incoherence are already being offered, as (9) illustrates.
The following lemma illustrates an intuitive property of infinite previsions.
Lemma 2. Let B be an event with P (B) > 0, and let X and Y be random variables with coherent 1 previsions P (X|B) and
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that
where 
In this section, we extend de Finetti's second coherence criterion in two ways: we include more general scoring rules, and we accommodate random variables with infinite previsions. For scoring rules of the form (2) we write
where we use the convention that an integral whose limits are in the wrong order equals the negative of the integral with the limits in the correct order. It follows easily from (11) that, if a and b are real numbers, then
where, for all a and b, ((a, b) ) .
In equations (12) and (13), we used the same convention as above about integrals with limits in the wrong order. In particular, λ ((a, b) 
Equation 12 makes it clear that, if P (X) is infinite, then P [g(X, q)] is going to be infinite for all q. This is why Definition 2 includes the clause that P (X) be finite before requiring that P [g(X, q)] be minimized at a = P (X). Nevertheless, strictly proper scoring rules can still be used to assess coherence in the spirit of coherence 2 . The following is our generalization of coherence 2 that applies both with general scoring rules and with infinite previsions.
Definition 6. Let C be a class of strictly proper scoring rules. Let {(X i , B i ) : i ∈ I} be a collection of pairs each consisting of a random variable X i and a nonempty event B i with corresponding conditional forecasts {p i : i ∈ I}. The forecasts are coherent 3 if, for every finite subset {i j : j = 1, . . . , n} ⊆ I, every set of scoring rules {g 1 , . . . , g n } ⊆ C, and every set {q 1 , . . . , q n } of alternative forecasts,
where c j = p ij for all j such that p ij is finite, and c j is finite and between q j and p ij for all j such that p ij is infinite. That is, no finite rival set of forecasts can provide a uniformly smaller sum of scores than the original forecasts. Theorem 1. Let C be a class of scoring rules of the form (2). A collection of conditional previsions is coherent 1 if and only if it is coherent 3 .
Proof. For the "only if" direction, assume that the conditional previsions are coherent 1 . We want to show that no rival set of previsions provides uniformly smaller sum of scores than the original previsions. That is, for each (X 1 , B 1 ), . . . , (X n , B n ) with conditional previsions p 1 , . . . , p n and each set {g 1 , . . . , g n } ⊆ C of scoring rules and each set {q 1 , . . . , q n } of rival previsions, we must show that
where c i = p i for all i such that p i is finite, and c i is finite and between q i and p i for all i such that p i is infinite. From (12),
Hence, the right-hand side of (15) is less than or equal to
The infimum of (15) is then less than or equal to the infimum of (16). Also
where the inequality follows from coherence 1 of the previsions. Hence the rival previsions do not provide uniformly smaller sum of scores than the original previsions.
For the "if" direction, we prove the contrapositive. Assume that the conditional previsions are incoherent 1 . If one of the previsions is the wrong value for a constant random variable, the result is trivial, so assume that each random variable takes at least two distinct values. We want to find a finite set of random variable/event pairs and corresponding conditional previsions together with a rival set of previsions such that the provide uniformly smaller sum of scores than the original set. That is, we need (X 1 , B 1 ), . . . , (X n , B n ) with conditional previsions p 1 , . . . , p n a rival set of previsions q 1 , . . . , q n , and a set g 1 , . . . , g n of scoring rules from C such that
where c i = p i for all i such that p i is finite, and c i is finite and between q i and p i for all i such that p i is infinite. In principle, some of the rival q i could be infinite, but the rivals that we construct below will all be finite.
By incoherence 1 , there exist (X 1 , B 1 ), . . . , (X n , B n ) with conditional previsions p 1 , . . . , p n , α 1 , . . . , α n and ǫ > 0 such that
where c i is finite for all i, c i = p i for all i such that p i is finite, and α i has the same sign as p i for all i such that p i is infinite. Without loss of generality, we can assume that max i |α i | = 1. Let g be a scoring rule in C with corresponding measure λ. Let g i = g for all i. Define
By construction c i − r(c i , q i (z), λ), c i − q i (z), and r(c i , q i (z), λ) − q i (z) have the same sign as α i for each i, and c i − q i (z) has the largest absolute value of the three differences. This means that, for all i such that p i is infinite and all z, c i is between q i (z) and p i . The remainder of the proof consists of showing that there exists z ∈ (0, z 0 ) such that ℓ(z) > 0. The desired rival previsions are then q 1 (z), . . . , q n (z). From (12),
Since, for all i, q i (0) = c i and q i (z) is continuous in z, there exists z 1 > 0 such that, for all z ∈ (0, z 1 ) and all ω,
Choose z ∈ (0, min{z 0 , z i }). Then combine (19), (20) and (21) to conclude that
which completes the proof. ✷ 5. Prevision and Expectation. The expectation of a random variable X defined on Ω is usually defined as the integral of X over the set Ω with respect to the underlying probability measure defined on subsets Ω. In the countably additive setting, such integrals can be defined (except for certain cases involving ∞ − ∞) uniquely from a probability measure on Ω. Dunford and Schwartz (1958, Chapter III) give a detailed analysis of integration, with respect to finitely additive measures, that attempts to replicate the uniqueness of integrals. Their analysis requires additional assumptions if one wishes to integrate unbounded random variables.
An alternative to defining integrals with respect to specific measures is to define integrals as special types of linear functionals. Then measures can be constructed from the integrals. (The integral of the indicator of a set is the measure of the set.) This is the approach used in the study of the Daniell integral. (See Royden, 1968 , Chapter 13. Regazzini, 1987 and Williams, 2007 takes a similar approach for bounded random variables only.) De Finetti's concept of prevision turns out to be a finitely additive generalization of the Daniell integral. (See Definition 7 below.) One major difference between the finitely additive Daniell integral and the theory developed by Dunford and Schwartz is that coherence 1 is the only assumption needed to define a finitely additive Daniell integral on an arbitrary space of random variables, including unbounded random variables and linear combinations of random variables with infinite integrals. Another difference is that multiple finitely additive Daniell integrals can lead to the same finitely additive probability distribution on Ω. Put another way, the finitely additive Daniell integral is not uniquely determined by its corresponding finitely additive probability.
In this paper, we take the approach of defining finitely additive expectations and probabilities in terms of finitely additive Daniell integrals, rather than integrals of the sort developed by Dunford and Schwartz (1958) . This section is devoted to deriving and illustrating the properties of finitely additive Daniell integrals and their relation to coherent 1 previsions.
Definition 7. Let L be a linear space of real-valued functions defined on Ω that contains all constant functions, and let L be an extended-real-valued functional defined on L.
whenever the arithmetic on the right-hand side of (22) The following simple result contains the primary justification for the names finitely additive Daniell integral and finitely additive expectation.
Lemma 3. Let L be a finitely additive Daniell integral on L, where L contains indicators of some subsets of Ω.
1. The restriction of L to those subsets of Ω whose indicators are in L is a finitely additive measure. If L(1) = 1, then L is a finitely additive probability.
2. The restriction of L to the simple functions in L matches the usual definition of integral of a simple function with respect to the measure in part 1.
Proof. , and the sum is well defined. So L is a finitely additive measure. If L(1) = 1, nonnegativity implies that L, restricted to the set of indicators of events, is a finitely additive probability on Ω.
2. Let X = n i=1 α i A i be a simple function with each A i ∈ L, all A i disjoint, and all α i distinct. Then linearity gives L(X) = n i=1 α i L(A i ), which is well defined and which matches the usual definition of the integral of X with respect to the measure L.
✷
Finitely additive expectations are like integrals in several ways, e.g., the two parts of Lemma 3 as well as the linearity in Lemma 5 below. Another way in which finitely additive expectations are like integrals is continuity with respect to the uniform metric. The proof of the following result is trivial and omitted. Proposition 1. Let X and Y be elements of a linear space L of real-valued functions defined on Ω. Suppose that
A special application of Proposition 1 is to a bounded function X. Every bounded function can be approximated arbitrarily closely by simple functions. So long as all of the approximating simple functions are in L, their finitely additive expectations will be arbitrarily close to the expectation of X. For example, if L is the set of functions that are measurable with respect to a σ-field, then every bounded function in L is uniformly approximable by simple functions in L. The expectations of all bounded random variables are then uniquely determined from the finitely additive probability on L. Hence, when the finitely additive expectation defined here is restricted to bounded functions measurable with respect to a σ-field, it is the same as the definition of integral developed by Dunford and Schwartz (1958) , and it is the same as the integral used by Dubins (1975) in his results about disintegrability.
On a linear space, coherent 1 previsions are the same as finitely additive expectations. One direction is simpler to prove than the other.
Lemma 4. Let L be a finitely additive expectation on a linear space L = {X i : i ∈ I}. Then L is a coherent 1 marginal prevision.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that a finitely additive expectation L is incoherent 1 when used as a marginal prevision. From the definition of finitely additive expectation, the domain of L is a linear space that contains all constants. Incoherence 1 implies that there exist i 1 , . . . , i n ∈ I, real numbers α 1 , . . . , α n , and real numbers c 1 , . . . , c n such that α j has the same sign as L(X ij ) when L(X ij ) is infinite, c j = L(X ij ) when L(X ij ) is finite, and
It follows that, there is ǫ > 0 such that
By nonnegativity and linearity of L, (24) because the arithmetic on the right-hand side of (24) is well defined (positive if infinite). A +∞ value on the right-hand side of (24) would contradict (23) as would a finite value. ✷
The other direction requires an additional result that is useful in its own right.
Lemma 5. Let D = {X i : i ∈ I} be a set of random variables that contains all constants, and let Q be a coherent 1 prevision on D. Let L be that part of the linear span of D that consists of linear combinations of the form Y = n j=1 α j X ij where each X ij ∈ D, and p Y = n j=1 α j Q(X ij ) is well-defined. Then P (Y ) = p Y for all Y ∈ L is well-defined, and it is the unique coherent 1 extension of Q to L.
Proof. We show first that P is well-defined, and then that it is the unique coherent 1 extension of Q to L. Throughout the proof, we rely on Lemma 1 because the proof is slightly less cumbersome when worded in terms of extendedcoherence. To see that P is well-defined, suppose to the contrary that Y ∈ L has two representations
where both sides of (26) are well-defined sums. That
is immediate from (25). Regardless of which sides (if any) of (26) are finite or infinite, (28) and the sum on the left-hand side of (28) is well-defined. This contradicts extended-coherence when combined with (27).
That P is extended-coherent is immediate from Definition 5. It is also clear that P extends Q to L. For each Y ∈ L, to see that p Y is the unique extendedcoherent value for P (Y ), let Y ∈ L be represented as stated and let p be an extended real number such that
We prove that setting P (Y ) = p is extended-incoherent. The sum (30) is well-defined, regardless of whether or not either side or both sides of (29) (30) is not 0, which makes P (Y ) = p extended-incoherent when combined with existing previsions. ✷
We can now prove the converse to Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. Let P be a coherent 1 marginal prevision on a linear space L that contains all constants. Then P is a finitely additive expectation.
Proof. That P (1) = 1 is immediate from coherence 1 . Lemma 2 tells us that X ≤ Y implies P (X) ≤ P (Y ). That P is extended-linear follows from Lemma 5. ✷
The ways in which coherent 1 previsions are more general than finitely additive expectations are the following:
• The domain of a coherent 1 prevision need not be a linear space.
• The domain of a coherent 1 prevision need not contain all constants.
• The definition of finitely additive expectation does not, as it stands, deal with conditional expectations.
It is trivial to extend the domain of a coherent 1 prevision to include all constants.
To extend the domain of a coherent 1 prevision beyond what Lemma 5 provides is the subject of the Fundamental Theorem of Prevision (Theorem 2). The results in Section 6 give the tools needed to give meaning to finitely additive conditional expectation.
Relationship Between Conditional Previsions and Marginal Previsions.
The relationship between marginal previsions and integrals is much more intuitive than the relationship between general conditional previsions and integrals. Even in the countably additive theory, conditional expectations are defined as Radon-Nikodym derivatives rather than as integrals. In the finitely additive theory used here, we defined finitely additive expectations (marginal previsions) as a type of integral (see Section 5). To a large extent, conditional previsions and marginal previsions determine each other. We make that statement precise in this section.
The results of this section fall into two categories:
• There are some relationships between conditional and marginal previsions that must hold in order for them to be jointly coherent 1 . For example
whenever the the product on the right is not 0 times an infinite value.
• There are some cases with P (B) = 0 in which P (X|B) is completely unconstrained by other specified previsions.
The first result is that, when P (B) > 0, P (X|B) is uniquely determined from P (B) and P (XB).
Lemma 7. Let D = {(X i , B i ) : i ∈ I} be a collection of random variable/nonempty event pairs with coherent 1 conditional previsions {P (X i |B i ) : i ∈ I}. Let (X, B) be a random variable/nonempty event pair such that (B, Ω) and (XB, Ω) are in D and P (B) > 0. Then the only possible coherent 1 value for P (X|B) is P (XB)/P (B) (even if the numerator is infinite.)
Proof. Let P (B) = q. First, assume that P (XB) = p is finite. We start by showing that the gamble αB(X − p/q) is acceptable for all real α. We know that α(XB − p) and −(p/q)α(B − q) are acceptable for all real α. Hence the following gamble is acceptable:
To see that every value other than p/q is incoherent 1 , suppose that P (X|B) = r = p/q. Then the following gamble would be acceptable for all real α:
when α has the opposite sign as −p + rq. Next assume that P (XB) = ∞, as the P (XB) = −∞ case is similar. First, we show that all gambles of the form αB(X − c) with c real and α ≥ 0 are acceptable. For each α ≥ 0 and real c, let c 1 = cq and β = −αc. Then
and the sum of gambles on the right is acceptable. To see that P (X|B) < ∞ is incoherent 1 , let α < 0, and let c be real. If αB(X − c) were acceptable, then the following gamble would be acceptable for all real d:
Let d > −cq to see that the infimum is negative. ✷ When P (B) = 0, there may be multiple possible coherent 1 values of P (X|B), but the set of possible values are determined from P (XB).
Lemma 8. Let D = {(X i , B i ) : i ∈ I} be a collection of random variable/nonempty event pairs with coherent 1 conditional previsions {P (X i |B i ) : i ∈ I}. Let (X, B) be a random variable/nonempty event pair such that (B, Ω) and (XB, Ω) are in D and P (B) = 0.
1. If P (XB) = 0, the only possible coherent 1 value for P (X|B) is the infinite value with the same sign as P (XB).
2. If P (XB) = 0, one can choose P (X|B) to be any extended-real number c X .
Proof.
Let c
′ have the same sign as P (XB) if P (XB) is infinite, and let c ′ = P (XB) otherwise. To see that the specified infinite value is coherent 1 , we will show that, for all real c and all α with the same sign as P (XB), αB(X − c) is an acceptable gamble plus a positive number. For each such α and c, αB
where αc ′ > 0 and the other two gambles on the right are acceptable. To see that no other value is coherent 1 , suppose that we try to set P (X|B) = p, where p is not the infinite value with the same sign as P (XB). Then the following gamble is acceptable, where α has the same sign as P (XB), and c = p if p is finite:
Hence P (X|B) = p is incoherent 1 .
2. We show that all gambles of the form α X B(X − c X ) with α X and c X real are acceptable. For each such α X and c X , let β = −α X c X . Then
and the two gambles on the right are acceptable.
✷
We are now in a position to define finitely additive conditional expectation.
Definition 8. Let L be a linear space of random variables, and let B be a collection of nonempty events that includes Ω. Suppose that XB ∈ L for every X ∈ L and B ∈ B. Let L be a finitely additive expectation on L. Let L(·|·) : L × B → IR ∪ {±∞} be such that for each B ∈ B, L(·|B) is a finitely additive expectation on L with L(XB|B) = L(X|B) for all X ∈ L and such that {L(X|B) : X ∈ L, B ∈ B} is a coherent 1 conditional prevision. Then we call L(·|·) a finitely additive conditional expectation.
The following result, whose proof is trivial, says that coherent 1 conditional prevision given an event of positive probability defines a finitely additive conditional expectation.
Proposition 2. Let P be a coherent 1 prevision on a linear space L containing all constants. Let B = {B : P (B) > 0}. Assume that XB ∈ L for each X ∈ L and B ∈ B. Define L(X|B) = P (XB)/P (B) for all X ∈ L and B ∈ B. Then L(·|·) is a finitely additive conditional expectation.
In light of Lemma 8, it is clear that not every coherent 1 conditional prevision given an event of 0 probability defines a finitely additive conditional expectation. After we prove the Fundamental Theorem of Prevision, we can show (Lemma 10) that, if we start with a coherent 1 marginal prevision, then for each nonempty event with 0 probability, there exists a coherent 1 conditional prevision that defines a a finitely additive conditional expectation.
7. The Fundamental Theorem of Prevision. Attempts to define a unique expectation from a probability often fail to provide an expectation for a random variable of the form X − Y where both X and Y have infinite integral, especially when XY is identically 0. Finitely additive expectations for such random variables are guaranteed to exist, but they may not be unique. The tool for extending a coherent 1 collection of (conditional) previsions to a larger collection is the fundamental theorem of prevision.
De Finetti (1974) proved an elementary version of the fundamental theorem of prevision. That versions said that, if a collection of events has been assigned coherent 1 previsions, then for each additional event E, there is a nonempty closed interval such that one can coherently choose P (E) to equal any number in that interval. Here, we prove a very general version that applies to unbounded random variables, infinite previsions, conditional previsions, and extensions to arbitrary collections of random variables.
The main step in the general version of the fundamental theorem is to start with a collection of coherent 1 conditional previsions and add one additional coherent 1 marginal prevision.
Lemma 9. Let D = {(X i , B i ) : i ∈ I} be a collection of random variable/nonempty event pairs with coherent 1 conditional previsions {P (X i |B i ) : i ∈ I}. Let X be a random variable. Then there exists a nonempty interval Proof. Let C be the set of acceptable gambles, and define
The first step is to show that a ≤ b. If either A = ∅ or B = ∅, the inequality is trivial, so assume that neither set is empty. We need to show that for all f a ∈ A and
The second step is to show that every value in the interval [a, b] is a coherent 1 value for P (X|Ω). Let p ∈ [a, b]. We need to show that, for every Y ∈ C, sup ω {Y (ω) + α[X(ω) − c]} ≥ 0, where c = p if p is finite, and α has the same sign as p if p is infinite. Consider first, the case when p is finite. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists Y ∈ C and α such that sup
and p − (ǫ/alpha) ≤ a, which contradicts p ≥ a. Next, consider the case in which p = −∞ so that α < 0, a = −∞, and A = ∅. Then −Y /α ∈ C, and X ≥ c − (ǫ/α) − Y /α, which means that c − (ǫ/α) ∈ A, which contradicts A = ∅.
The last step is to prove that every number outside of the interval [a, b] is an incoherent 1 choice for P (X|Ω). First, assume that we choose P (X|Ω) = p < a. Of necessity, A = ∅, a > −∞, and for every f ∈ A, there exists Y ∈ C such that Y + f ≤ X. Let α < 0, let c = p if p is finite and c < a if p = −∞. Next, choose f ∈ (c, a] and Y ∈ C such that Y + f ≤ X. Then −αY ∈ C, and
showing that P (X|Ω) = p is incoherent 1 . Finally, assume that we choose P (X|Ω) = p > b. Of necessity, B = ∅, b < ∞, and for every f ∈ B, there exists Y ∈ C such that −Y + f ≥ X. Let α > 0, let c = p if p is finite and c > b if p = ∞. Next, choose f ∈ [b, c) and Y ∈ C such that −Y + f ≥ X. Then αY ∈ C, and
showing that P (X|Ω) = p is incoherent 1 . ✷ As an example of Lemma 9, we return to Example 1 Example 3. In Example 1, Ω is the set of integers. We introduced a random variable X = ∞ k=1 k{ω = k} after assigning previsions P ({ω = k}) = 2 −k for k ≥ 1. We then proved (among other things) that every number in the interval [2, ∞] could be chosen as a coherent 1 prevision for X. This fact actually follows from Lemma 9. Let D = {({ω = k}, Ω) : k an integer}. The acceptable gambles have the form
where only finitely many α k are nonzero. In order for Y + f ≤ X it is necessary and sufficient that
We can get f as close as we want to 2 by choosing α k = k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n and n large. This makes a = 2 in Lemma 9. Since sup ω [−Y (ω) + f ] is finite for all acceptable gambles and all f , −Y + f ≥ X is impossible. Hence, the set B in the proof of Lemma 9 is empty, and b = ∞.
We are now in position to prove the general extension theorem.
Theorem 2. Let D = {(X i , B i ) : i ∈ I} be a collection of random variable/nonempty event pairs with coherent 1 conditional previsions {P (X i |B i ) : i ∈ I} and that contains all pairs of the form (c, Ω) with c a real number. Let F be a set of random variable/nonempty event pairs that contains D. Then there exists a coherent 1 extension P ′ of P to F .
Proof. We prove the result by extending P one gamble at a time and applying transfinite induction to cover the whole set F . Let D 0 = D and
For each successor ordinal γ + 1, assume that we have a coherent 1 extension P γ to D γ . (The assumption is true by hypothesis when γ = 0.) We extend P γ to D γ+1 as follows. Apply Lemma 9 with D = D γ and X = B γ+1 to find a coherent 1 marginal prevision for B γ+1 . Let D ′ = D γ ∪ {(B γ+1 , Ω)}. Apply Lemma 9 with D = D ′ and X = X γ+1 B γ+1 to find a coherent 1 marginal prevision for X γ+1 B γ+1 . Apply Lemma 7 or Lemma 8 to find a coherent 1 conditional prevision for X γ+1 given B γ+1 . Set P γ+1 (X γ+1 |B γ+1 ) equal to this coherent 1 conditional prevision. This completes the induction step for successor ordinals.
If γ is a limit ordinal, assume that we have a coherent 1 extension of P to P β for all β < γ. Each (X, B) ∈ D γ is either in D or equals (X β , B β ) for some β < γ. So we define P γ (X|B) = P β (X|B). These previsions are coherent 1 because every finite collection appears in the induction at some β < γ. This completes the proof of the induction step. ✷ Finally, we can prove the existence of finitely additive conditional expectations that agree with coherent 1 conditional previsions.
Lemma 10. Let D be a collection of random variables that contains all constants with coherent 1 marginal previsions P (·). Let L be the linear span of all functions of the form XB for X ∈ D and B a nonempty event. There exists a coherent 1 conditional prevision on the set {(X, B) : X ∈ L, B = ∅} such that P (·|B) is a finitely additive conditional expectation for each nonempty B.
Proof. Use Theorem 2 to extend P to {(X, Ω) : X ∈ L}, which includes all pairs of the form (B, Ω) with B = ∅. Lemma 7 and the first part of Lemma 8 specify all of the conditional previsions whose coherent 1 values are uniquely determined from the marginal previsions. The proof of the second part of Lemma 8 actually shows that P (X|B) can simultaneously be set to arbitrary values for all (X, B) with P (B) = P (XB) = 0. The proof will be complete if we can choose values for all such P (X|B) so that the resulting P (·|·) is a finitely additive conditional expectation. The only restrictions that we have to obey are those caused by conditional previsions fixed by the first part of Lemma 8. For each B with P (B) = 0 and each X ∈ L, let X B : B → IR be defined by X B (ω) = X(ω) for ω ∈ B. That is, X B is X restricted to domain B. Let D B be the set of all (X B , B) such that X ∈ L and either P (X|B) is uniquely determined by the first part of Lemma 8 or X is constant on B. For constant X, set Q(X B |B) equal to that constant, and for all other X, let Q(X B |B) = P (X|B). This makes Q(·|B) a coherent 1 marginal prevision on D B with B as the state space. Use Theorem 2 with Ω = B and D = D B to extend Q to {(X B , B) : X ∈ L}, which makes Q(·|B) a finitely additive expectation on {X B : X ∈ L}. Define P (X|B) = Q(X B |B), and note that P (XB|B) = P (X|B) and P (·|·) is a finitely additive conditional expectation. ✷ 8. Discussion. In this paper we extend both of de Finetti's (1974) concepts of coherent prevision to unbounded random variables and infinite previsions. We define infinite prevision so that it makes sense in the gambling interpretation of prevision. We define how proper scoring rules can be used to score potentially infinite previsions. We extend the equivalence of the avoidance of sure loss from gambling and the nonexistence of uniformly smaller scores to a large class of strictly proper scoring rules and potentially infinite previsions. We use a finitely additive extension of the concept of Daniell integral to define finitely additive expectation on an arbitrary linear space of random variables, and show that it is equivalent to our extension of coherence to include infinite previsions. We give a version of the fundamental theorem of prevision that applies to unbounded random variables, infinite previsions, and conditional previsions. The fundamental theorem allows extension of a coherent conditional prevision from an arbitrary set of random variables to an arbitrary larger set of random variables, including the set of all random variables.
